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Abstract
The paper examines competition between multi-sided platforms
and analyzes the prots and the pricing strategies that emerge. Focus-
ing on a Stackelberg pricing game it shows how price discrimination
helps a platform coordinating the choices of consumers. After pro-
viding general bonds on equilibrium prots, it characterizes equilib-
ria assuming a particular resolution of the coordination game played
by platformsusers, that favours the leader (favorable expectations).
Even under the most advantageous conditions, a platforms may be
adversely a¤ected by the ability of competitors to exploit asymme-
tries in multi-sided externalities. Results are then used to characterize
the equilibria of a game of perfect price-discrimination by competiting
networks, where the largest network is shown to be too small from a
welfare perspective, and of a game with two sides (with sequential and
simultaneous prices). Various implication are then discussed, such the
possibility of excessive entry or the incentives to interconnect.
1 Introduction
Platforms o¤er services used by di¤erent types of agents to interact with
each other, thereby involving externalities. Platforms then rely on complex
price schemes, involving discrimination and non-linear tari¤s, to allocate
the surplus between their members and provide adequate incentives. Fol-
lowing Caillaud and Jullien (2003), Rochet and Tirole (2003) and Armstrong
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Crémer, Jean Tirole and Jean Charles Rochet for their detailed comments, Patrick Rey
and Rossella Argenziano for useful discussions, as well as seminar participants at IDEI,
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nomic Theory. This work builds extensively on a research paper initiated while visiting
the European University Institute, entitled "Competing in Network Industries: Divide
and Conquer" (2000).
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(2006), the literature on two-sided markets has improved substantially our
understanding of these strategies, and provided valuable insights on the func-
tioning of several markets.1 This includes for instance the payment cards
market (Wright 2003, Rochet and Tirole (2002)), intermediation services
(Caillaud and Jullien (2001, 2003)), mobile telephony termination charges
(Wright (2003), Armstrong (2003)), or the media market (Anderson and
Coates (2005), Gabszewicz, Laussel and Sonnac (2001a,b), Ferrando et al
(2003)), video games (Hagiu (2006)).
As emphasized by the literature on two-sided markets, the design of the
price structure must account for the need to coordinate the users. The price
charged to a user reects not only the cost of service but also the externalities
associated with his/her participation. One intuition for this specicity of a
platforms pricing strategies is that each individual is not only a user but
also an "input", since his/her participation creates value for other user. As
an input, the user is a scarce resource. Firms then compete both to sell the
outputs (interactions) and to buy the inputs (participation). Competition
may then lead to aggressive strategies o¤ering very advantageous terms,
even a subsidy, to some sides and exploiting the network externalities to
generate prots on other sides: a divide-and-conquer strategy (Innes and
Sexton (1993), Caillaud and Jullien (2001, 2003)). Such a strategy allows
a platform overcoming the coordination problem by transferring part of the
surplus to targeted customers and creating a bandwagon e¤ect. Notice that
this bears similarity with the dynamic mechanism that leads a network to
subsidize early customers, as analyzed by Farell and Saloner (1986) and by
Katz and Shapiro (1986,1992).2
This paper analyses "divide&conquer" pricing strategies in a model of
platform competition encompassing both vertical and horizontal di¤erenti-
ation. The focus is on price skewness and on the extent of market power
that one can expect in such markets. Multi-sided externalities are dened as
externalities between distinct and well identied groups of agents, for which
it is possible to charge di¤erent prices. Groups may be reduced to a single
individual. The model focuses on participation externalities, assuming that
the utility of an agent is a¤ected by the number of participants of each other
side.3 The paper analyzes equilibrium prices and prots, providing new in-
sights on the nature of business strategies used by platforms to conquer or
1See Rochet and Tirole (2006) or Jullien (2005) for general presentations.
2See Bensaid and Lesne (1996) or Cabral, Salant and Woroch (1999) for applications
to dynamic monopoly pricing. Recent progress on the modeling of dynamic competition
between networks with forward looking consumers has been made in Fudenberg and Tirole
(2000) and Cabral (2008).
3A very enlightning analysis of price skewness and competition in two-sided markets
with usage externalities is Weyl (2006).
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preserve market shares. The analysis is then used to characterize equilib-
ria and e¢ ciency in two cases of interest: perfect price-discrimination in a
one-sided market with network e¤ects; and two-sided market.
The multi-sided market set-up encompasses not only multi-sided plat-
forms where distinct types of users buy distinct services, but also situation
where a network price-discriminates between users of the same service.4
For instance, software suppliers discriminate between residential and pro-
fessional users, as well as geographic areas. As it will be clear below, two
groups of users that are subject to price-discrimination by a network can be
treated as two distinct sides in a multi-sided market context. The analysis is
thus of interest for understanding platform competition, and network com-
petition under price discrimination. The set-up thus covers a wide range of
activities, such as intermediation activities, nancial market places, telecom-
munication services, postal services, medias, operating systems and software
applications, research centers,....
The paper examines a situation where various types of users have di¤er-
ent valuations for the goods and services available on the platforms, as well
as for the participation of other sides. It is assumed that each side is homo-
geneous, that users register with only one platform - there is single-homing
-, and that multi-sided externalities are not too large compared to the value
attached by a user to the direct consumption of the goods o¤ered by the
platform. To this respect, this work is complementary to Caillaud and Jul-
lien (2003), Ambrus and Argenziano (2003), or Damiano and Li (2005b)
who consider pure intermediation services.
The core of the paper characterizes the prot that a platform can obtain
in a sequential pricing game where it is a Stackelberg leader. This allows to
analyze the ability of the leader to exert market power, and also provides
an upper bound on the prot of a platform in the simultaneous move game.
The analysis of the simultaneous pricing game is presented for the case of
two sides only.
Due to multi-sided externalities, consumers face a coordination problem
in their purchasing decision, that may generate multiple equilibria (Katz and
Shapiro (1985)). The paper addresses this issue in two steps. First, some
bounds are derived for the prots of the leading platform that are valid
for any equilibrium. Then the analysis focuses on a particular equilibrium
selection for the subgame where users choose between platforms, deriving
4Second degree price discrimination is not considered here. Damiano and Li (2005a)
propose an analysis of endogenous sorting with a self-selection mechanism for a matching
monopoly.
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the equilibria and characterizing the conditions under which the bounds are
attained. The selection criteria captures the idea that there is a "focal"
platform that any user joins whenever this is his choice in at least one equi-
librium of the subgame. This extends the concept of favorable expectations
used by Hagiu (2006) and by Caillaud and Jullien (2003). To this extent,
this paper is also complementary to contributions on two-sided markets that
focus on selection criteria limiting to some extent the level of coordination
failure (Ambrus and Argenziano (2003) for instance).
Divide&conquer strategies target some groups with subsidies and charge
other groups, and the paper shows how these strategies can be designed in
a multi-sided context by interpreting the price charged to one side as the
combination of a subsidy and of a charge. With two sides, the side generating
the highest externality is a natural candidate for a subsidy. However there
is no obvious ranking with multiple sides and the paper also shows how to
identify the sides targeted with low prices.
In a competitive context, divide-and-conquer strategies eliminate the
ability of a platform to capture a positive share of the surplus generated by
the multi-sided externalities. The e¤ect is stronger when externalities are
asymmetric: sides valuing less the participation of others become the object
of an intense competition as they are more value-enhancing relatively to
others. Competition for these sides then dissipates the prots obtained with
bandwagon e¤ects, to a point that may even prevent the existence of a pure
strategy equilibrium in a simultaneous pricing game. This strong intensity of
competition is one of the key di¤erence with the more conventional analysis
of network competition with uniform prices.
With multi-sided externalities, the market allocation is ine¢ cient, and
not surprisingly there may be excessive sales by the focal platform. More
surprisingly, there may be excessive sales by the non focal platform. Even
a focal platform o¤ering a uniformly superior quality may fail to cover the
market and may have to leave some protable niche for the rival, as a mean
to soften competition on other sides. Faced to this problem, one strategy
for the platform is to focus more on horizontal di¤erentiation at the expense
of vertical di¤erentiation. For instance it may be optimal to degrade the
quality o¤ered to some targeted sides, as a commitment to compete only for
other sides, thereby inducing market sharing.
Another consequence of tough competition is that platforms may be
better o¤ when interconnecting their services, i.e. allowing their members
to interact with the other platforms members. Without interconnection,
platforms are very aggressive in building market shares, exploiting multi-
sided externalities through cross-subsidies. Interconnection suppresses the
motives for cross-subsidization and restores the benets of di¤erentiation.5
5This reasoning assumes away exclusionary motives and externalities within sides.
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As mentioned above, there is a close connection between the economics
of multi-sided markets, and the economics of price-discrimination in net-
work industries. While there is already a substantive literature on com-
petition with network e¤ects under uniform prices (see Katz and Shapiro
(1994) and Economides (1996)), little attention has been devoted to price-
discrimination, and this despite the fact that the practice is widespread for
network services. The paper illustrates this by applying the analysis to per-
fect price-discrimination by competing networks with size related network
e¤ects. Increasing the value of network externalities raises the equilibrium
size of the largest network, but not as much as welfare maximization would
require. Thus in equilibrium the largest network is too small. This result is
similar to the result obtained by Argenziano (2005) for a model of network
competition without price-discrimination.
The paper is organized as follows. Section 2 introduces the ideas with a
very simple free vs pay platform example. Section 3 presents the model and
the assumptions. Section 4 presents general results concerning the analysis
of competitive strategies and equilibria. Section 5 then denes the concept of
favorable expectations and analyses the model under this assumption. The
remaining sections discuss specic cases. Section 6 presents the application
to perfect price-discrimination with one-sided network e¤ects, while section 7
focuses on the two-sided market case, discussing equilibria for the sequential
and the simultanous pricing game. Section 8 discusses the implications of
the results. Section 9 concludes.
2 Warm-up: divide&conquer and ine¢ cient entry
Consider an incumbent, free-access platform A serving two homogeneous
sides of mass 1, j = 1; 2: The utility of a side j member at the platform when
nA` agents participate on the other side is U
A
j = uj + jn
A
` , where uj > 0
and j > 0 is the value attached to the participation of the other side. By
convention assume that 1 < 2: If the platform is the only platform on the
market, all consumers participate.
Suppose now that a commercial platform B wishes to enter. The plat-
form charges prices:
pB =

pB1 ; p
B
2
	
:
Prices can be negative (see the discussion below). The platform is vertically
di¤erentiated by a factor , so that the utility of a side j member at the
platform B is UBj = uj    + jnB`   pBj .
When designing its prices, platform B must account for potential co-
ordination failure that may prevent consumers from exploiting protable
opportunities if this requires a joint move of both sides. Indeed, when the
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two prices are such that
uj      pBj > uj + j ; (1)
both sides coordinating on platform A is an equilibrium allocation of con-
sumers: given that the other side joins platform A; a consumer should
join platform A: We say that platform B faces unfavorable expectations
whenever for all prices verifying condition (1), no consumer joins platform
B: When this is the case one may conjecture that entry should be deterred
to some extent, but we now show that this is not the case.
Faced to such unfavorable expectations platform B can use the following
strategy:
 pB1 <     1 (divide);
 pB2 <   + 2 (conquer).
With this price pB1 , a member of side 1 prefers joining platform B alone
than A with side 2, since u1 + 1 < u1      pB1 : Thus any equilibrium
allocation of consumers is such that side 1 joins platform B: An immediate
consequence is that side 2 also joins platform B: Indeed the choice for a
member of side 2 is now between joining side 1 or staying with A: Under the
above condition, the former dominates unambiguously, since its members
obtain a utility u2 at platform A and u2    + 2   pB2 > u2: Thus both
sides at Bis the unique equilibrium allocation of consumers at these prices
(formally this results from iterated elimination of dominated strategies for
consumers).
As a result the maximal prot pB1 + p
B
2 that platform B can secure with
this strategy is
B =  2 + 2   1:
The remarkable feature is that, since 2   1 > 0; platform B is able
to generate a positive prot out of network externalities even when  = 0
is positive, meaning that an equally e¢ cient platform can enter faced to a
free platform and obtain positive prot. Platform B subsidizes one side and
chooses the target for subsidy. Here it is side 1 because 1 < 2 : the side
generating higher cross-group externality (lower j) is targeted. The reason
is that targeting the low externality side requires a subsidy smaller than the
recoupment 2 obtained on the high externality side.
More generally, platform B obtains positive prots whenever  < 2 12 ;
thus for positive values of : There is ine¢ cient entry: platform B may
conquer the market even if it is less e¢ cient.
The remaining of the paper extends these intuitions to the case where
platform A sets prices and there are more sides.
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3 The model
Consider two competing platforms, denoted A and B, with a production
cost normalized to 0. The platforms bundle a consumption good and an
intermediation service subject to externalities. There are J di¤erent types
of users, each represented by a "side" composed of a mass mj of identical
agents with a unit demand. The set of sides is denoted J :
Denote ukj the utility (or intrinsic value) derived by a member of side j
from the good of platform k; and let j = uAj   uBj be the stand-alone
quality di¤erential for side j.
The intermediation service value depends on the composition of the pop-
ulation that the platform allows to reach, and each side values di¤erently
the participation of every other side to the platform. The valuation of a user
on side j for the participation of nl members of side l 6= j is jlnl; where
the coe¢ cients jl are nonnegative. The base model doesnt consider the
possibility of within-side network e¤ects, so jj = 0; but the extension to
the case where users care also about their own side raises no di¢ culty and
is presented at the end of the section. The choice of not considering it here
is made rst to focus on the multi-sided aspect, and second because welfare
conclusions would be more ambiguous.
As we will see in section 6, the model encompasses also the case of perfect
price discrimination which obtains when mj = 1 for all j and each side is
interpreted as an individual.
If nAl and n
B
l members of side l join A and B respectively, a side j user
joining platform k obtains a utility
Ukj = u
k
j +
X
l 6=j
jln
k
l   pkj :
To x ideas, it is assumed that 21  12: I focus on the case where the
network externalities at the platform level are not too large compared to the
intrinsic value of the good. More specically it is assumed that:
Assumption 1: 8j : uBj 
P
l 6=j jlml:
To give an example, the benets of using the same text editor are con-
ned within small communities, and presumably smaller than the value of
using a text editor. As another example, consider third generation mobile
services. Base services include voice services or email access under universal
connectivity. For these services, the penetration rate is very high, and as-
suming that operators dont engage into network based price discrimination,
we can reasonably assume that there is no network e¤ect. But the provi-
sion of more sophisticated services such as TV, and internet services have a
multi-sided nature.
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One can also reinterpret this property as the result of a su¢ cient level
compatibility between services or standards in a context of imperfect com-
patibility (see Jullien (2006)). However the assumption may not hold for
matching agencies for instance, for which network e¤ects swamp the intrin-
sic value.
The core of the paper focuses on the Stackelberg game where A is a
leader. The competitive game is thus composed of three stages:
Stage 1.1 : Platform A sets prices PA.
Stage 1.2 : Platform B sets prices PB.
Stage 2 : Users simultaneously decide which platform to join if any.
Equilibria for the simultaneous move equilibria, as well as the reverse
sequential timing, are discussed afterward.
There are several reasons for focusing on this game. From a policy
perspective, the Stackelberg game allows us to better understand the level of
market power that a rm can expect by focusing on the reaction of its rivals
and the competitive constraint it faces. In particular we will be able to derive
bounds on the prot of platform A; that are also valid in a simultaneous
pricing game. Second, it ensures tractability, while the simultaneous pricing
game raises problems of multiplicity, as well as problems of existence.
Faced to prices PA = fpA1 ; ::; pAJ g and PB = fpB1 ; ::::; pBJ g; users coor-
dinate on a rational expectation equilibrium allocation (REA) dened as
an allocation
n
nkj
ok=A;B
j=1;J
such that the choice of each individual is optimal
given the prices and the choices of other consumers. To avoid technicalities
and w.l.o.g. in the present context of homogeneous sides and positive net-
work externalities, we restrict attention to REAs such that nkj 2 f0; 1g: An
allocation rule, denoted A(PA; PB); is a mapping from the set of prices to
the set of users allocations, that assigns to every price vector a REA. An
equilibrium consists in an allocation rule A; and of equilibrium prices for
the game where sides are allocated according to A: I will discuss a specic
allocation rule in section 5, but for the rst part of the paper, I will only
assume the following mild assumption:
Assumption 2: Let S be the set of sides joining platform B in A(PA; PB):
For any price vector P^B such that p^Bj = p
B
j for j 2 S, all sides j 2 S
join platform B in A(PA; P^B):
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The assumption is here to prevent pathological allocations, and it is
a mild assumption compatible with the selection criteria used in the two-
sided literature.6 The idea is that if side l is not buying from platform B;
then changing the price for side l can only be a "good news" for the clients
of platform B; as this can either have no e¤ect or attract this side which
benets all customers of platform B: It is substantial only when there is the
possibility of coordination failure between customers of platform B, inducing
multiple allocations. Then it could be the case that in situations where side
l would never buy from platform B; customers of platform B use the price
on side l as a coordination device, and join platform B only for particular
values of pBl although this is irrelevant for them. It also rules out situations
where a deviation from equilibrium by platform B that could attract side l
is prevented by customers coordinating in such a manner that they would
leave the platform B if side l were to join, despite the fact that their welfare
would increase.
The assumption is compatible with the selection criteria used in the
two-sided market literature. Indeed most criteria tend to limit the lack of
coordination through various means, and assumption 2 is a very mild ver-
sion of this. For instance, Ambrus and Argenziano (2003) use a di¤erent
concept, coalitional rationalizability, with a similar property. The concept
of favorable expectations that is developed later on veries this condition.
4 General results
4.1 Preliminary considerations
Before we state the main results, a few points are worth mentioning. As-
sumptions 1 and 2 imply rst that in equilibrium all sides join one platform.
Indeed platform B could always propose a slightly positive price to members
of side l if they dont buy and attract them, without loosing any customer.
We denote by K the set of sides joining platform A in equilibrium, while
J nK is the set of side joining platform B:
For the same reason, a member of a side j 2 K cannot obtain a larger
utility by joining platform B at a positive price: Otherwise platform B could
just propose this price along with a zero price to other sides buying from
A; without altering the prices for the sides on its platform: because of
Assumption 2; the targeted side j and all the previous customers of platform
B (sides in J nK) would join platform B; and the prot of platform B would
increase.
6The assumption is slightly stronger than what is required for the results that follow.
Indeed we need that: (2bis) For any

p^Bj
	
j =2S and " > 0; there exists P^
B such that: i)
prices are p^Bj for j =2 S; ii)
p^Bj   pBj  < " for j 2 S, iii) sides j 2 S join B in A(PA; P^B):
Assumption 2 is more intuitive and simplies the presentation of the results.
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Thus in equilibrium, it must be the case that the utility obtained with
A by a user of a side j 2 K is larger than the minimal utility that this user
may obtain with platform B :
8j : uAj +
X
l2K
jlml   pAj  uBj +
X
l =2K
jlml:
Using j = uAj  uBj ; selling to sides within the set K requires platform A to
set prices such that
8j : pAj  j +
X
l2K
jlml  
X
l =2K
jlml  uAj ; (2)
where the latter inequality follows from Assumption 1. Condition (2)
implies that the utility level that side j would obtain joining A alone is
nonnegative: uAj   pAj  0: This ensures that in any subgame following A0s
pricing decision; side j joins A if not B. Thus when discussing potential
deviation for platform B, we need not worry about the possibility that some
users buying from A in equilibrium may decide to stay out of the market,
which simplies greatly the analysis.
4.2 Divide&conquer
The general idea of the paper is that even faced with the worst situation
a follower platform B can use a "divide-and-conquer" strategy to overcome
its disadvantage. To do so, platform B has to favor some sides: platform
B can charge a very low price to one side, if selling to this side allows to
sell to another side at a high price.7 To follow insights from Innes and
Sexton (1993), one may view the situation as one in which platform B
faces users who have the possibility to form a coalition (to join A). To
prevent the formation of the coalition, platform B may need to bribe
some users. However it needs not bribe all users but only enough of them to
ensure that the value of the sub-coalition composed of the remaining users
is reduced to a point where it becomes unattractive. The characteristic
of divide&conquer strategies is that they allow to capture demand for any
allocation rule A, because they are constructed in such a way that joining
the platform is a dominant strategy for the targeted sides.8 They thus solve
the coordination problem and allow a platform capturing part of the value of
network externalities. This subsection presents an intuitive characterization
of these strategies and of their e¤ects on prots.
7Notice that given that costs are normalized to 0, prices should be interpreted as
margins and a negative price is a price below marginal cost. In the model, the real price
may, but need not, be negative. One interpretation in this case is that the customer
receives free access to the platform, and is subsidized through additional free goods and
services (see Amelio and Jullien (2007)).
8See Segal 2003 for similar ideas applied to constracting with externalities.
10
As an introduction, suppose that there are only two sides and that plat-
form A sets prices pAj  uAj : Reminding that 12  21; let us build a
strategy that enables platform B to attract both sides. For any prices such
that pBj  pAj   j   jlml, assumption 2 implies that side j joins platform
A if the other side does. Thus to attract some users, platform B needs to set
one price pBj below p
A
j  
 
j + jlml

, say pB1 : Then, as in the warm-up sec-
tion, a member of side 1 joins platform B irrespective of what the other side
does. Following the logic of the warm-up section, platform B can attract
side 2 with a price such that uB2 +21m1 pB2  uA2  pA2 : The maximal price
that platform B can set on side 2 is thus pA2   2 + 21m1: By attracting
side 1, platform B has reduced the attractiveness of platform A for side 2
by an amount 21m1, and has increased its own attractiveness by the same
amount. The overall prot from this strategy is
B = pA1m1 + p
A
2m2  
2X
j=1
jmj + (21   12)m1m2: (3)
Since 21   12  0; platform B is able to generate a positive prot out
of network externalities. Thus there is a strong value attached to being able
to react to the opponents prices by choosing who to subsidy.
The key part of the paper consists in extending this insight to J sides. For
this purpose, suppose again that platform A sets prices such that pAj  uAj for
all j: Then, from the preliminary considerations, all consumers buy from one
platform. This simplies the exposition as it implies that a consumer always
prefer joining platform A to staying out of the market.
Suppose that platform B tries to sell to the subset L and for the sake of
exposition set L =f1; 2; ::::; Lg. If platform B sets the prices at levels such
that for all sides uAj +
P
l 6=j jlml   pAj > uBj   pBj ; then there is a REA
where no consumer joins platform B: To avoid this platform B can set one
price at a level that guarantees the willingness of a member of side j to join
alone. Say that for side 1 :
uB1   pB1 > uA1 +
X
l>1
1lml   pA1 : (4)
The resulting price includes a subsidy equal to the maximal value of exter-
nalities
P
l>1 1lml: Then joining platform B is a dominant strategy for a
member of side 1: Given that this is commonly known, any price pB2 such
that
uB2 + 21m1   pB2 > uA2 +
X
l>2
2lml   pA2 (5)
induces a member of side 2 to join as well:
It follows that if both (4) and (5) are veried, sides 1 and 2 join platform
B in any market allocation. The process can then continue: a member of
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side 3 joins at a price that makes it more attractive to join sides 1 and 2; as
opposed to staying with sides above 3 at platform A. More generally, side j
is charged by platform B a price that ensures that its members join given
that all sides l < j join:
uBj +
X
l<j
jlml   pBj > uAj +
X
l>j
jlml   pAj (6)
The pricing strategy is thus built in such a way that after j rounds of
elimination of dominated strategies in stage 2, there are j sides for which
the only remaining strategy is to join platform B: The condition 6 allow to
design prices enabling platform B to sell to L irrespective of the allocation
rule.
More generally, platform B has the choice of the set L of sides targeted,
and of the order in which sides are subsidized. Indeed platform B benets
from subsidizing the sides valuing less the network e¤ects, since the required
subsidy is smaller than the value of the network externalities that platform
B can extract from the other sides. Denote (:) a permutation on the
set of sides , where (l) > (j) means that j is "ranked" before l: The
interpretation is that platform B sets prices such that a member of side j
is willing to join provided that it is sure that all sides ranked below in the
targeted set L join as well:
uBj +
X
l2L
(l)<(j)
jlml   pBj > uAj +
X
l2L
(l)>(j)
jlml +
X
l =2L
jlml   pAj :
The minimal prot that platform B can secure with the subset L of sides
is obtained by summing the corresponding prices over the sides pondered by
the size ml of sides:
X
j2L
0BB@pAj mj   jmj + X
l2L
(l)<(j)
jlml  
X
l2L
(l)>(j)
jlml  
X
l =2L
jlml
1CCAmj >X
j2L
pBj mj :
Optimizing on the order  and the subset L yields a lower bound on platform
B0s prot:
B  max
L
8<:X
j2L
pAj mj  
X
j2L
jmj +
(L)  B(L)
9=; : (7)
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where

 (L) = max
(:)
8>><>>:
X
j2L
X
l2L
(l)>(j)
(lj   jl)mlmj
9>>=>>; (8)
B (L) =
X
j2L
X
l2JnL
jlmlmj ; B (J ) = 0 (9)

(L) captures the prot that platformB can generate with cross-subsidization,
the maximization coming from the optimal choice of targeting. This term
has a very simple interpretation: when side j is attracted before side l;
platform B must give a subsidy to the members of side j equal to their
opportunity cost jlml of leaving side l; but it can charge an extra amount
ljmj to the members of side l corresponding to the value of joining side j.
The net e¤ect is then (lj   jl)mlmj : Because platform B can choose the
order of targeting, 
(L) is non-negative
Lemma 1 For all L; 
(L)  0; with equality if and only if for all j; l within
L; jl = lj : Moreover 
(L)+
 (L0)  
 (L [ L0) :
Proof. See Appendix.
B(L) is the total value of the network e¤ects between sides within L and
sides outside L: Since platform B sells only to L, it must compensate its
customers for the foregone value of network externalities.
Thus, when platform B reacts to the prices of platform A , it has the
ability to exploit the presence of network e¤ects within the group of tar-
geted consumers, but he may be disadvantaged by the potential network
externalities between its customers and the customers of platform A: The
objective in this section is then to identify which e¤ect dominates: the fa-
vorable expectations advantaging platform A; or the ability to react with
cross-subsidies advantaging platform B: We will show that the latter domi-
nates, and in particular that platform A cannot obtain a prot larger thanP
j2L jmj when selling to a subset L of sides, which represents simply the
quality di¤erential associated with the good o¤ered by the platform.
4.3 Maximal equilibrium prots for the leader
With the property 7 characterizing minimal prot for platform B; we can
now analyze the strategic possibilities opened to the leader. Suppose that
platform A decides to sell to sides within a subset K. How much prot
can it expect, given the possibility that platform B uses a divide&conquer
strategy.
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Platform A can sell in equilibrium to K only if platform B cannot deviate
and attract protably some subset of K with a divide&conquer strategy. A
bound on prots can then be obtained by deriving the condition for the
subset K itself. One di¤erence with the above discussion of divide&conquer
is that we have to consider a deviation from an equilibrium allocation were
platform B sells if K 6= J , while above we were considering only whether
platform B could sell or not. But Assumption 2 implies that restricting
attention to strategies with constant prices on J nK ensures that these sides
always buy from platform B: We can then ignore them for the analysis of
the market allocation and apply the above reasoning on the subset K: We
need also to incorporate the fact that having a secured clientele raises the
relative value of platform B compared to platform A: Then to obtain an
upper bound on prot, it is su¢ cient to state a necessary condition for
platform B not being able to attract the whole set K with a divide&conquer
strategy.
Proposition 1 Suppose that platform A sells to sides within K in equilib-
rium, then its prot is smaller than or equal to A (K) = Pj2K jmj  

(K)  B(K):
Proof. Starting from equilibrium prices, consider a deviation by B that
maintains constant all the prices outside K: Then Assumption 2 ensures that
in any REA, sides in J nK buy from B: We can thus treat them as passive
and focus on the sides in K: Given that it is common knowledge that sides
in J nK buy from B; a consumer in K anticipates a utility uBj +
P
l =2K jlml
if she is the only from K joining B: The resulting reduced game is thus the
same game as above played on the sides j 2 K only instead of J , and where
the intrinsic value uBj is replaced by u
B
j +
P
l =2K jlml: Then for the set
L = K; platform B can increase its prots by
X
j2K
pAj mj 
X
j2K
 
uAj   uBJ  
X
l =2K
jlml
!
mj+
(K) =
X
j2K
pAj mj 
X
j2K
jmj+
(K)+B(K):
For this to be an equilibrium this must be non-positiveX
j2K
pAj mj  
X
j2K
jmj +
(K) + B(K)  0: (10)
and thus X
j2K
pAj mj 
X
j2K
jmj   
(K)  B(K):
Condition (10) states that using a divide&conquer strategy to conquer
the whole market is not protable for platform B: It is the same as the
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above equation (7) but accounting for the fact that since sides outside K
join platform B in any case, the value of platform B is augmented by the
corresponding value B(K) of multi-sided e¤ects that sides in K would be
sure to obtain if they join platform B:
One point worth noticing when comparing (7) and (10) is that the dif-
ference between the two formulas is 2B(K); reecting the fact that platform
A sells to sides outside K in the former case, while platform B does in the
latter case. This illustrates the fact that the opportunity cost for platform
A of not serving side j is equal to twice the value of the externality that this
side generates for its customers. The reason is that the value of the exter-
nality is transferred to platform B if it sells to the side instead of platform
A; thus the total value of platform A is reduced by B(K) while the value
platform B can o¤er to platform A0s increases by B(K):
A key implication of the results is that platform A cant benet from the
presence of multi-sided externalities, since its prot is bounded by the protP
j2K jmj it would obtain if no users attached a value to the participation
of other sides (jl  0; for all j and l). This contrasts with the case of
networks e¤ects between members of the same side, as S would benet
from the presence of positive network e¤ects within sides (see the discussion
section).
5 Favorable expectations and focal platform
Given the bounds derived above, the question is now to understand when
these bounds can be reached and how. To generate maximal prots for
platform A we need to exhibit the allocation rule that is the most favorable
to platform A: This allocation should capture the idea that platform A
benets from an advantage because userstend to coordinate on it. While
this notion may be ambiguous in a general context, it takes the form of a
simple selection criteria when there are positive network externalities, due
to the following result:
Lemma 2 Fix the prices PA and PB; and consider all REAs for these
prices. Let K be the set of sides with a positive participation to platform
k in at least one REA and S be the set of sides with full participation
to platform s in all REAs. Then there exists a REA; denoted Dk(P k; P s);
such that all sides in K join platform k, and only sides in S join platform s.
Proof. See Appendix
The key feature is that the value of a platform uniformly increases when
new users are added to its customer base. According to a bandwagon e¤ect,
moving sides from s to k raises the incentives to join k for all individuals
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and reduces the incentives to join s: Thus there exists a unique REA that
at the same time maximizes the market share of platform k and minimizes
the market share of platform s. This follows from the fact that the users
allocation process exhibits strategic complementarity (see Topkis (1979),
Vives (1990)).
The most favorable allocation for platform A is one where it dominates
the coordination process in the sense that users coordinate on DA(PA; PB).
To avoid inexistence problems that may be created by discontinuities at
indi¤erence points of users, the allocation is allowed to di¤er from DA at
such points. Dening DA as the closure of DA :9
Denition 1 (Favorable expectations) Platform k is focal if
8(PA; PB); A(PA; PB) 2 Dk(PA; PB):
Admittedly a strong criteria, the assumption allows capturing in a simple
way the role of users coordination in the emergence of market power in
platform industries. The term "favorable expectations" is borrowed from
Hagiu (2004) who, building on Caillaud and Jullien (2003), uses a similar
concept to analyze the emergence of dominant platforms in a two-sided
model where sides choose the platform sequentially. It refers to the fact that
coordination failures in the market are always resolved in favor of platform
A.
Favorable expectation veries the version (2bis) of Assumption 2 and
thus is compatible with it.
Which rm is focal at a particular point in time depends on history or
some exogenous factor. I must stress that being a focal platform refers only
to the consumers coordination process, and need not imply that the rm
appears to be dominant. Indeed market power results from the combined
e¤ects of the coordination process, the quality of services and the timing of
prices.
To see the di¤erence with other criteria, consider the case of two networks
competing with uniform prices for identical agents who care only about the
size of the network. Then the Pareto criterion or coalitional rationalizability
imply that all consumers join the network that generates the highest surplus,
so that the most e¢ cient platform serves the market. By contrast, under
favorable expectations for platform A, all consumers coordinate on platform
A as long that the surplus obtained on platform A including the value of
network e¤ects is larger that the surplus that an individual would obtain
alone on platform B, thus excluding the value of network e¤ects. Platform
A can then sell even in some cases where it is less e¢ cient than platform B:
9For almost all prices, DA coincides with DA: At points of discontinuity, agents of some
side joining A are indi¤erent between A and B: A slight reduction of the price of B for
this side would induce them to join B, and the bandwagon e¤ect may induce other sides
to follow. DA(PA; PB) thus includes also lim"!0DA(PA; PB   "):
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Notice that understanding the best-reply of one platform under favorable
expectations is also useful for the more general case whereA is not restricted.
Indeed for given prices of platform A, the criteria minimizes the payo¤ of
platform B: Thus the easiest way to support any equilibrium is to assume
that, following a deviation from equilibrium strategies by platform k, users
coordinate on D k(P k; P k); which minimizes the deviation prots, with-
out restricting the allocation of consumers on the equilibrium path. This
methodology is used for instance in Caillaud and Jullien (2003) to character-
ize the set of equilibrium prots and allocations of a pure matching model
under simultaneous pricing and no restriction except the monotonicity of
the equilibrium selection.
Since they favor platform A; one can conjecture that a focal leader should
be able to generate the maximal prots. We now investigate whether the
bound in proposition 1 is the maximal prots.
The rst case is when platform A sells to all sides. Indeed in this case it
sets all prices below the intrinsic values: pAj  uAj : Faced to a focal platform,
the divide&conquer strategies described in section 4.2 are the only strategies
that allows platform B to sell. Then platform A covers the market if and
only if the prot derived in equation (7) is non-positive for all K: We show
in appendix that there exists a pricing strategy that veries these conditions
and yields maximal prots.
Proposition 2 A focal platform A can obtain the prot A (J ) by selling
to all sides.
Proof. See Appendix
The prot that platform A generates when covering the market is then
equal to the total quality di¤erential on the good minus the prot that
platform B could get by exploiting multi-sided externalities: A (J ) =PJ
j=1 jmj   
 (J ) : Notice that the result is very general and doesnt de-
pends on assumption 2:
Whether the bound on prots can also be obtained when platform A
doesnt cover the market and sell only to a subset K is a more delicate issue,
because we did not consider all divide&conquer strategies. Indeed the bound
were obtained by xing the prices set by platform B for the sides it serves in
equilibrium and varying the other prices only. It thus ignore the possibility
that platform B uses more complex strategies involving all the prices.
These more complex strategies dont matter when multi-sided e¤ect are
pairwise symmetric, that is when for all j; l : jl = lj : Indeed, in this case
the implicit ranking of sides is irrelevant so that proposition 1 gives the
prot.
Proposition 3 When multi-sided e¤ect are pairwise symmetric (8j; l : jl =
lj), a focal platform A can obtain the prot 
A (K) by selling to sides within
K.
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Proof. See Appendix
When multi-sided externalities are symmetric (jl = lj), their e¤ects in
the divide-and-conquer strategy cancel out and 
(K) vanishes and A (K) =P
j2K jmj   B(K). Multi-sided externalities with a platform are neutral
for platform A in this case, and what matters is the value of externalities
not realized between platforms. In this case platform A chooses the set K
so as to maximize A (K). In particular it covers the market if B (K) >
 Pj =2K jmj for all K:
Compared to this case, introducing some asymmetry can only worsen
the case for platform A. In particular if j  0 for all j; the Stackelberg
leader leaves the whole market to its rival. The results also shows that
Corollary 1 If platform A is focal, A (J )  0 and for all subsets KX
j =2K
jmj + B(K)  
(J )  
(K):
then platform A covers the market at equilibrium.
Proof. The result follows from the comparison of the value of the prot
when platform A covers the market (proposition 2) and the bounds on mar-
ket sharing prots (proposition 1).
Focal platform B
To complete this section let us just mention what occurs if instead of
platform A; platform B is the focal platform. The di¤erence with before is
that platform B can capture all the surplus from network e¤ects without
relying on cross-subsidization. By attracting a new side, platform B could
then capture the value of the externalities between this side and its own
clients, but also the value created to its clients when the new side joins
the platform. This generates a total potential value di¤erential in favor of
platform B equal to the sum of the quality di¤erential and the total increase
in the value of network e¤ects on platform A when it attracts the whole
population instead of sides within the equilibrium set K only.
Proposition 4 Suppose that platform B is focal. The prot that platform A
obtains when it sells to sides within K is A = P
j2K
jmj  B(J nK)  B(K):
Proof. See Appendix
In particular, if platform A covers the market it obtains prots
A =
X
j2J
jmj  
X
(j;l)2JJ
jlmjml:
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6 Perfect price-discrimination with uniform net-
work e¤ects
As pointed above, the analysis is the same if a side is constituted by a
single individual. Setting mj = 1; then J is the number of individuals and
pj is interpreted as an individualized price. Thus one application of the
multi-sided framework developed is the case of perfect price-discrimination
with network e¤ects. Let us apply this framework to the conventional case
where consumers care only about the size of the network, by assuming in
this section:
Property 1: 8j; l; jl = ; mj = 1; j  j+1;
where individuals are ranked by decreasing order of preference for net-
work A:
Assume for the moment that all individuals have identical taste for the
goods, so that for all j : j = : From proposition (3), when able to set
di¤erent prices to di¤erent sides, platform A covers the whole market with
prot  if it is positive, while platform A cannot protably attract a set of
consumers if  < 0:
Thus, with uniform preferences, the equilibrium allocation is e¢ cient.
The non focal platform is able to overcome the coordination problem and
to pass the full value of the surplus to its customers, which eliminates inef-
ciencies.10
Allowing the intrinsic utility to di¤er across consumers, the prot for the
network A serving individuals in K isPj2K j  K(J  K) where K is the
cardinal of K, which implies that network A serves a set K = f1; :::;Kg and
choose the size
KA () = argmax
K
KX
j=1
j   K(J  K)
We see that the benets of adding one more side is
K+1    (K + 1) (J  K   1) + K(J  K) = K+1   (J   2K);
larger than K+1 if K > J2 :When it serves more than half of the market, the
leader would serve all sides for which it has a larger quality ukj and more,
but if it is smaller than its rival, it may refrain from including some side
for which it is more e¢ cient. The reason is that the leader benets from
increasing asymmetries between the size of the network as this minimizes
the value of the externalities between users of di¤erent platform.
10One consequence of this is that if we drop assumption 2, and consider a simultaneous
pricing game, there is a unique e¢ cient equilibrium.
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Proposition 5 For 0 >  :
KA  0  J2   KA ()  J2 . If the prot
is quasi-concave in K, then either KA
 
0
  KA ()  J=2 or KA  0 
KA ()  J=2:
Proof. See Appendix.
Under quasi-concavity, increasing  increases the size of the largest net-
work. Quasi-concavity is required as for large ; some tipping may occur
where a small network A decides to cover the market. For instance suppose
that
PK
j=1 j is maximal at K
A (0) < 1=2, but that
PJ
j=1 j > 0: For a low
but positive , network A reduces its market share to KA < KA (0) : But at
some point, its prot will fall below
PJ
j=1 j ; so that it will prefer to serve
the whole population and KA () may jump to J:
Thus competition with perfect price discrimination tends to generate
less balanced allocations than competition based solely on intrinsic values.
However the allocation is too balanced from a social welfare perspective.
Indeed welfare writes as
JX
j=K+1
uBj +
KX
j=1
uAj + K
2 + (J  K)2
=
0@ JX
j=1
uBj + J
2
1A+
0@ KX
j=1
j   2K(J  K)
1A
Comparing with the prot ofA, we see that, up to the rst constant term, the
di¤erence betweenA0s prot and welfare is K(J K); the value of the exter-
nalities between members of di¤erent platforms, maximal at K = J=2; when
the platforms are of equal sizes. Divide&conquer strategies by network B
prevents network A from capturing all the value of the externalities gener-
ated when attracting more sides. Here network A obtains only half of them.
This implies that the allocation is biased toward the allocation generating
the least value of network e¤ects, namely the balanced allocation.
Proposition 6 Let total welfare be maximal at K: Then either K 
min

1=2;KA()
	
or K  max1=2;KA()	 : If in addition welfare is
strictly quasi-concave in K; then either K  KA()  1=2; or K 
KA()  1=2:
Proof. The equilibrium size of A maximizes w (K)+K(J K); where
w (K) =
PK
j=1 j 2K(J K) denote the welfare gain. Suppose that K 
1=2. Then for K > K; K(J  K) > K(J  K) so that KA ()  K:
If in addition w (K) is quasi-concave
Thus the market share of the network that should be the largest from a
welfare perspective is too small in equilibrium. If we add the requirement
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that welfare is quasi-concave in K; still the largest network is the right
one. Therefore welfare maximization would require increasing the size of the
largest network. The conclusion is similar to the result of Argenziano (2005)
on one-sided externalities. She analyzes a model of competition between
networks with uniform prices and concludes that the largest network size
is suboptimal in equilibrium. The same result holds under perfect price-
discrimination but for di¤erent reasons. In the case of uniform prices, the
result follows from the relation between mark-ups and network e¤ects. In
the present case, this is due to an attempt of the leader to protect its market
share, faced to "excessive" competition due to price-discrimination.
7 Two-sided markets with a focal platform
In order to obtain more specic results on market shares and prots, let us
focus on a two-sided market (J = 2) with a focal platform A: I start with
the sequential timing but will extend the results to a simultaneous pricing.
7.1 Sequential timing
If platform A is focal and covers the market, its prot is (remind that 21 
12):
A = 1m2 + 2m2   (21   12)m1m2:
The question here is whether platform A prefers to cover the market, or to
let platform B sell to some side.
To x ideas, suppose that platform A gives up on side 2 and serves
only side 1. From proposition (1), platform A cannot expect more than
1m1   12m1m2: But this bound may not be attainable. The reason is
that proposition (1) didnt consider all possible strategies that platform B
can use. Indeed, to sell to side 1; platform B could just undercut (by an
amount 1 12m2) the price pA1 charged by platform A to this side keeping
the same price for side 2, which yields the above bound on platform A0s
prot. But an alternative strategy for platformB is to exploit the bandwagon
e¤ect associated to the success of attracting side 1. To do so, platform B
increases the price it charges to side 2 by an amount equal to the value
(21m1) attached by side 2 to the participation of side 1: Obviously this
raises again the issue of coordination failure, as at the new price side 2
could prefer to join platform A: Platform B must then secure side 1 by
undercutting the price set by platform A by a much larger amount than
before, indeed by an amount 1 + 12m2: If side 2 values the externality
much more than side 1, this strategy is the most protable for platform B,
and prevent it requires that platform A reduced its price below the level of
proposition 1. As a result we obtain:
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Lemma 3 When J = 2 and platform A sells to side j only, its prot is
Aj = jmj  maxfjl; lj   jlgmlmj.
Proof. See Appendix.
Thus, if 21 > 212; irrespective of whether platform A covers the whole
market or sell to 1 only, the main limitation on its strategy is always the
indirect prot that platform B can obtain on side 2 by attracting side 1 with
a subsidy.
Intuition suggests that, when sharing the market and selling only to side
j, platform A should leave to platform B the opportunity to gain a high
prot on side l alone and thus set a high price pAl . The proof of the lemma
shows that the optimal price on side l is then pAl = u
A
l + ljmj : it lets
platform B capturing its maximal prot uBl ml; with a price p
B
l = u
B
l ; while
maintaining the willingness of side 2 to join platform A along with side 1: An
interpretation is that platform A induces cooperation by platform B with
some type of stick and carrotstrategy which can be stated as: you can
serve one side with high prot, but dont try to be aggressive on the other
side, or I will take it back.
Let us now turn to the equilibrium analysis, which amounts to the com-
parison of the three levels of prot, A; A1 and 
A
2 : The equilibrium is then
as follows:
Both sides join platform A if
1m1 + 2m2  (21   12)m1m2;
1   12m2 and 2  inff0; 21   212gm1;
Side 1 joins platform A and side 2 joins platform B if:
1  maxf12; 21   12gm2 and 2 < inff0; 21   212gm1;
Side 2 joins platform A and side 1 joins platform B if:
1 <  12m2 and 2  21m1:
In the remaining cases, all sides joins platform B:
The market share of platform A is represented in the space (1; 2); for
the case 12 < 21 < 212 in Figure 1. Straight lines delineate the ranges
where platform A covers the market, or sells only to one side, or to none. The
dotted lines delineate the same range but for the allocation that maximizes
total surplus.
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S covers
W covers
S sells
to side 2
1d
2d
S sells
to side 1
Figure 1
The rst point is that platform A may be unable to sell, even in cases
where both 1 and 2 are positive. Even a platform that o¤er better qual-
ities and dominates the coordination process in stage 2 may not be able to
generate a positive prot on the market. While this is exacerbated by the
sequential timing and the second mover advantage of platform B; we will
see that this is deeper and the same conclusion holds under a simultaneous
timing.
The second point is that the prot loss due to multi-sided externalities
is always higher when platform A serves only one side than when it serves
two sides. As a consequence, if platform A sells, it will not give up on a side
for which it o¤ers a higher intrinsic utility:
for l 6= j; l  0) A  Aj :
The motive for abandoning one side is thus grounded into a quality
advantage of platform B. In particular market sharing can only occur when
there is a su¢ cient degree of horizontal di¤erentiation (j > 0 > l).
Compared with the case where there is no externality (where platform
A serves side j if j  0); the range of parameters for which the market
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is shared between the two platforms is reduced. Without surprise, network
e¤ects tends to generate some tipping, extending the range of market cov-
ering by one platform. But this can translate into an increase or a decrease
of the focal platforms market share. When platform A has a large quality
di¤erential on some side (j high) and a rather small disadvantage on the
other (l negative but small in absolute value), platform A will cover the
market, in order to secure side j: On the other hand, with strong horizontal
di¤erentiation, platform A is not able to obtain positive prots and leaves
the whole market to platform B:
It is also fairly easy to see in the two-sided market case that when the
value attached to the externalities by one side moves closer to the value
attached by the other side, the focal leaders prot raises (weakly) and plat-
form A is more likely to serve both sides. Thus, network e¤ects are the more
detrimental to platform As prots and market shares, the more asymmetric
they are.
7.2 Simultaneous pricing with a focal platform
The Stackelberg prots derived above are upper bounds on the prots that
the platforms can achieve in the simultaneous pricing game. With network
e¤ects however, these prots may not be reached in a simultaneous pricing
game. This section discusses equilibria for the case where platforms A and
B set they prices simultaneously. Formal derivation is in appendix.
Consider an equilibrium where platform A covers the market. From the
analysis of platform B0s best response in the sequential game, platform A0s
prices must verify:
pAj  j + jlml; (11)
0  pA1m1 + pA2m2  A; (12)
along with the condition for the market allocation:
pBj  pAj   j   jlml: (13)
The question is now whether one can set prices for platform B in such a way
that A doesnt deviate. This requires binding condition 13 on both sides.
When platform As prices are nonnegative, this is su¢ cient to obtain an
equilibrium. However, some price may need to below cost, and in this case
platform A may be tempted to serve only the other side. One way to look
at this issue is to analyze the opportunity cost of not selling to side j served
at a loss. platform A looses the (negative) income pjmj =
 
j + jlml

mj ,
and since side j joins platform B instead of platform A; the valuation of
platform A by the other side decreases by an amount equal to the value of
the externality ljmj ; while the valuation of platform B increases by the
same amount. This forces platform A to decrease the price for side l by
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twice this amount. The net opportunity cost for platform A of not selling
to side j is thus
 
j + jlml + 2ljml

mj : Platform A prefers to cover the
market rather than to sell to l only when this opportunity cost is positive.
Indeed an equilibrium with platform A selling to both sides exists if
A > 0 and
 
j + jlml + 2ljml

mj for both sides.
A similar reasoning allows to dene for the case where platform B covers
the market.11 From proposition 4, the maximal prot that platform B can
expect is
B =  1m2   2m2   (21 + 12)m1m2:
An equilibrium where platform B covers the market exists if B  0 and
the opportunity cost for platform B of not selling to side j is positive which
yields (di¤erences arise because A is focal).
1   (12 + 221)m2  0 and 2   21m1  0:
The analysis of market sharing situations follows the same lines. Suppose
that platform A serves side j and platform B serves side l: Then it must be
protable for platform A not to sell to side l. The relevant criteria is again
the opportunity cost for platform A of not selling to side l which must be
nonpositive. There exists an equilibrium with simultaneous pricing where
platform A sells to side j and platform B sells to side l 6= j if and only if:
if j = 1 : 1 + (12   221)m2  0 and   2   (21 + 212)m1  0 ;
if j = 2 :  1   (12 + 221)m2  0 and 2   21m1  0:
The global equilibrium conguration is depicted on Figure 2: Dotted
lines delineate the range of market sharing in the sequential game.
11With 12 = 21; the results applies by labeling side 1 the side that maximizes jmj :
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Figure 2
Compared to the sequential game, there is less market sharing. In par-
ticular platform A covers more often. Notice also that platform A obtains
less than its Stackelberg prot when it sells to side 1 only, and when it covers
the market while it were sharing the market as a leader.
7.3 Welfare
Let us compare the equilibrium conguration with the e¢ cient allocation.
Market sharing maximizes total surplus whenever 12 < 0 and (12 +
21)m1m2 < minfj1jm1; j2jm2g; which corresponds to a pattern of strong
horizontal di¤erentiation with small network e¤ects. Otherwise platform
A should cover the market if 1m1 + 2m2 > 0; while platform 2 should
cover the market if 1m1 + 2m2 < 0: The dotted lines in Figures 1 show
the delimitations of the various range of quality di¤erentials. There can be
excessive sales by platform A which can take the form of ine¢ cient market
covering by platform A or ine¢ cient market sharing.
More surprisingly, given the fact that platform A benets from favorable
expectations, there is also the possibility of excessive sales by the non focal
platform B both in the sequential game and in the simultaneous game. It
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occurs when it would be optimal that platform A covers the market, and
nevertheless it cannot sell at all or sell only to one side. Price discrimina-
tion may allow platform B to generate a prot that outweigh the quality
di¤erentials in favor of an e¢ cient leader.
In the sequential game, platform A may prefer to let its competitor sell
to one side, although it would be more e¢ cient that it cover the market.
The motive for platform A is that this weakens competition on the other
side.
To illustrate this e¤ect, set m1 = m2 = 1; and suppose that side 1 values
only platform A but not network e¤ects or platform B: uB1 = 0; 12 =
0: Suppose that side 2 has no value for platform A: uA2 = 0: Assuming
that uA1 > 21 > u
B
2 ; the e¢ cient allocation has both sides at platform A:
However the optimal strategy for A is to give up on side 2 by setting a price
21 on side 2. This allows to charge u
A
1   21 to side 1; while platform B
charges uB2 to side 2: This conclusion holds despite the fact that side 2 would
be willing to pay a larger amount (21) to join platform A than the price
charged by platform B:
To see why this is the case, consider what occurs if platform A lower
its price pA2 to zero. Platform B can not sell to side 2 alone at a positive
price and has no other option than to attract both sides or none. But with
a divide-and-conquer strategy subsidizing side 1, platform B can generate
prot:
 
pA1   uA1

+
 
uB2 + 21

: To avoid that platform A would need to
reduce pA1 below u
A
1   21   uB2 : This means reducing the price on side 1 by
an amount uB2 . Thus even at a price that would generate almost no prot
on side 2; platform A would have to reduce its price pA1 by a nite amount
compared to the level it can charge with market sharing.
In both cases, market sharing or market covering by platform A, selling
to side 1 allows platform B to create and capture some extra value on side 2.
Thus, despite uB1 = 0; side 1 has some value for platform B, who is willing
to compete for it. But in the market sharing case, this value is just the
externality for side 2, while when platform A covers the market, it is the
sum of the externality and the intrinsic value, since both come together. By
giving away side 2, platform A allows its competitor to extract the intrinsic
value without having to ght for the other side, reducing the value attached
by platform B to the participation of side 1 to its platform. Thus platform
A weakens competition.
8 Discussions and extensions
8.1 Platform interconnection
Compare the result with a situation without the multi-sided e¤ects. This
occurs when platforms interconnect and allow clients to interact with mem-
bers of the both platforms. An example of this strategy is provided by the
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alliances between European nancial market places.
Suppose that users of interconnected platforms benet from externalities
with all users, irrespective of their choice, while the components ukj are
preserved. For any individual, the comparison between the two platforms
reduces to the comparison between the goods, thus of uAj   pAj and uBj  
pBj : The competition game reduces to a standard Bertrand type game, where
each side constitutes a specic market. Platform A sells to side j if and
only if uAj  uBj : The prot that the interconnected platform A is thenP
j2J maxfj ; 0gmj . It is then immediate that:
Corollary 2 The prot of platform A is larger when platforms are inter-
connected.
Proof. A obtains less thanmaxK
nP
j2K jmj
o
=
P
j2J max fj ; 0gmj :
While externalities raises the incentive to reach a large population, plat-
form A is not able to appropriate the e¢ ciency gains associated with these
externalities. Moreover, it may have to sell to some sides despite the fact
that j < 0; because there is an opportunity cost of letting them joining the
competitor. Choosing to interconnect may then be one way to avoid these
problems.
Notice that, by using assumption 2, we derived bounds for platform
A0s prots that hold for any selection of the market allocation of users.
Moreover, it is fairly easy to see from the proof that these bounds are valid
for the case where platforms set prices simultaneously. It follows that when
platforms set prices simultaneously, the prot of each platform in a pure
strategy equilibrium is smaller than the prot it obtains when platforms are
interconnected. This conclusion doesnt rely on assumption 2:
These conclusions rely however on the absence of within-sides network
e¤ects. Indeed positive network e¤ects between members of the same side
may refrain platform A from interconnecting with platform B, as it can ob-
tain an extra prot on each side served, that vanishes under interconnection
(see section 8.3). The prot that platform A can obtain by cornering the
market is now augmented by the total value of within-side network e¤ects
(see below). Thus platform A0s prot may be above the interconnected
prot.
8.2 Strategic degradation of quality for targeted customers
One of the general principle that emerges is that head-to-head competition
dissipates prot. One way to escape from such situation of intense compe-
tition is to achieve enough horizontal di¤erentiation. In the present model,
this means shifting from a market covering equilibrium to a more peaceful
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market sharing situation. When a platform controls the quality of the good
at the individual level, it can reach this objective by degrading quality for
some customers.12
With simultaneous pricing, there are cases where platform A would pre-
fer to share the market, but cannot because at any price that allows platform
B to sell, platform A has the ability to attract the whole market. Degrading
the quality on one side is one way to induce the more protable market
sharing situation.
To illustrate this phenomenon, suppose that platform A covers the mar-
ket in equilibrium with prices pA1 = 1+12m2 < 0 and p
A
2 = 2 21m1m2 >
0 (which is compatible with equilibrium conditions): platform A sells to
side 1 at a loss to protect its market. Consider what happens if platform
A can at no cost and publicly reduce uA1 before the price game (holding
uA2 constant) up to a point where the new quality di¤erential falls short of
 (12 + 221)m2: Then the new equilibrium involves market sharing: plat-
form A sells to side 2 only with prot (2   21m1)m2 > A: It is thus
protable to do so.
The point here is that platform A would like to commit not to compete
on side 1; as an alternative to being forcedto include side 1 in its platform
despite a competitive hedge in favor of platform B on this side. A targeted
degradation of quality is one way to achieve such a commitment (a "puppy
dog" strategy). The same phenomenon may hold for platform B as well.
More generally when a platform can choose the technology and a¤ect
perceived qualities, and when it cant gain a large quality advantage on
both sides, it will have incentives to shift its technological choices toward
the preferred technology of one side and the least preferred technology of
the other side. This may generate ine¢ ciencies in technological choices and
even result in the choice of a dominated technology.
8.3 Within-side cross-e¤ects
In the paper, it is assumed that there is no externality between members
of the same side. One can allow for such an externality by setting jj  0:
It is straightforward to see that lemma 2 still holds, so that the concept
of favorable expectations is well dened. Then the value of the within-side
externalities jj can be attributed to the platform benetting from favorable
expectations :
Lemma 4 Consider a market with jj  0 for all j; and alternative market
that di¤ers only by the facts that for all j; jj = 0 while the value of platform
12Both the motive for quality reduction and the way it is achieved di¤er substantially
from models of damaged goods and screening as Denekere and McAfee (1996) and Hahn
(2000).
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A0s good is uAj + jjmj : Then the two models generate the same maximal
allocation rule DA(PA; PB):
Proof. See Appendix.
Thus the market allocation at given prices can be derived as if the
intrinsic value di¤erential were ^j = j + jjmj with no network e¤ect
within sides. The reason is that the favorable expectation selection criteria
implies that a side can be treated as an homogenous entity (all its members
join platform A or all its members join platform B) that accounts for the
within-side externality only when considering joining platform A: Apart for
the welfare analysis, all the results of the paper extend to this case replacing
j by ^j :
8.4 Inexistence of a pure strategy equilibrium
With simultaneous pricing, a pure strategy equilibrium fails to exist when
the platforms o¤er goods of similar characteristics. The natural question is
whether this is due to the assumption 2 (favorable expectations).
Clearly, relaxing assumption 2 allows to extend the set of equilibria.
But, although the range of existence increases when all market allocations
are considered, the inexistence problem remains if platforms are not di¤er-
entiated enough and there is some asymmetry in externalities. To see that,
notice that in any pure strategy equilibrium of a simultaneous pricing game,
the prot of a platform is bounded above by the Stackelberg prot it can de-
rive when it is focal. Otherwise there would be a strategy of the rival that
would raises its prots by extending it market share. But if the di¤erences be-
tween the intrinsic values of the goods are small, no platform can protably
sell as a Stackelberg leader. In particular, with two sides, a pure strategy
equilibrium fails to exist if
P
j
uAj   uBj mj < minf12; 21   12gm1m2.
The inexistence issue thus appears to be a robust phenomenon for network
that are not di¤erentiated.
9 Conclusion
By focusing on the e¤ect of cross-group externalities the paper derives
striking results that apply to multi-sided market and network competition
with price-discrimination. Probably the most striking feature is that price-
discrimination may reduce considerably the level of barriers to entry in net-
work industries, and even be the source of ine¢ cient entry. The analysis
deserves to be extended in several directions.
For one thing, sides were supposed to be homogeneous, which favors
tipping. Extension of multi-sided markets to heterogenous sides may help to
understand market sharing congurations and di¤erentiation strategies.
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Most importantly, two dimensions are missing in the model: time and
risk.
Divide&conquer strategies may require selling below cost, which may
be very risky in environments with demand uncertainty, since the platform
may fail to recover the subsidy on others sides. Accounting for risk should
reduces the e¤ectiveness as competitive tools.
The analysis should clearly be extended to account for dynamic con-
siderations. Dynamics may allow to identify more precisely the pattern of
cross-subsidy since sides may have to join a platform at di¤erent dates. A
dynamic divide&conquer strategy may require to run negative cash-ows
for sometime, and thus need nancial resources. With an imperfect capital
market, this means that platforms having access to a deep-pocket should
have a strong advantage over nancially constrained platform. The analysis
of platform competition should then devote special care to nancial aspects.
The strategies may also require negative prices and these may be hard
to target. They may attract clients who just grab the subsidy and are not
interested by the platforms services. Moreover these clients may generate
negative externalities on other members of the platform. The strategy would
then be to use in-kind subsidies targeted at attracting only active users of
the platform, but these are usually costly while the model assumes no social
cost associated with subsidies.
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A Appendix
Proof of lemma 1. Denote 
(J ) =Pj2J P(l)>(j)(lj   jl)mlmj : For
any order  on J there is an exact reverse ordering ^ and it veries 
(J ) =
 
^(J ). Hence the maximum over all permutations is non-negative. The
maximum is zero i¤ 
(J ) = 0 for all . Suppose this is the case. Fix
j; l. Consider a permutation  such that (j) = J   1 and (l) = J; and
 that coincides with  except that (j) = J and (l) = J   1: Then
0 = 
(J ) = 
^(J ) + 2(lj   jl)mjml which implies that jl = lj : The
same proof holds for L  J :
Moreover suppose  and 0 are the argument in the maximum for L and
L0: Denote 0 the order that ranks 2 sides of L according to ; 2 sides of
L0 according to 0; and all sides L before all sides of L0:


0
(L [ L0) = 
(L) + 
(L0) +
X
j2L;l2L0
(lj   jl)mlmj
Dene similarly the order 0 where L0 is ranked before L:


0(L [ L0) = 
(L) + 
(L0) +
X
j2L0;l2L
(lj   jl)mlmj
Since
P
j2L0;l2L(lj   jl)mlmj =  
P
j2L;l2L0(lj   jl)mlmj ; one of the
two is non-negative. Thus 
(L [ L0)  
(L) + 
(L0)
Proof of lemma 2. Consider two REA : i = 1; 2, where sides allocate
according to inkj 2 [0;mj ] and let Ki be the set of side with inkj > 0; and
Ai the set of sides with insj = mj . Then
j 2 Ki ) ukj +
X
l2Ki
jl

inkl

  pkj  maxfusj +
X
l =2Ai
jl

inkl

+
X
l2Ai
jlml   psj ; 0g
) ukj +
X
l2Ki
jlml   pkj  maxfusj +
X
l2Ai
jlml   psj ; 0g
j 2 J n (Ai [ Ki)) 0  max
8<:ukj +X
l2Ki
jl

inkl

  pkj ; usj +
X
l =2Ai
jl

inkl

+
X
l2Ai
jlml   psj
9=;
) max
8<:ukj +X
l2Ki
ijlml   pkj ; 0
9=;  usj +X
l2Ai
jlml   psj
Now suppose that we impose that no member of in J n (A1 \ A2) join s,
and that all members of sides in K1 [ K2 join k. Since for the sides in
J n (A1 \ A2) :
maxfukj +
X
l2K1[K2
jlml   pkj ; 0g  usj +
X
l2A1\A2
jlml   psj ;
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the minimal benet that a member of a side in J nA1\A2 can obtain when
not joining s is larger than the maximal benet it can gain when joining s.
Therefore the optimal strategy is either to join k or not to join at all. More-
over for a user in K1 [K2; ukj +
P
l2K1[K2 jlml  pkj  0; implying that the
optimal strategy for this user is indeed to join k. Now take an equilibrium of
the game with strategy spaces restricted as described. This is an equilibrium
of the allocation game with the property that nkl 2 f0; 1g ; K1[K2  K and
AA1\A2:
Taking a maximal element completes the proof.
Proof of propositions 2 and 3. Suppose that A wants to sell to
K and A sets pAj  uAj for j 2 K and pAj > uAj +
P
l jlml for j =2 K:
Suppose that wants to sell to L = f1; 2; :::; Lg. Since A is focal, B cannot
sell unless one side is willing to join alone since otherwise there would exists
an allocation where no side joins B. Let let j for this side and set  (j) = 1:
it is such that
uBj   pBj  max
(
0; uAj +
X
l2K
jlml   pAj
)
:
By the same reasoning, there must be some allocation willing to join if only
side  1 (1) joins. For this side we set  (j) = 2: Recursively, if the strategy
is such that all sides l ranked below some level, l 2  1 (f1; 2::; rg), joins
even if other sides dont, attracting an additional side j requires that B sets
a price such that
uBj +
X
(l)<(j)
jlml pBj  max
8>><>>:0; uAj +
X
(l)>(j)
l2K\L
jlml +
X
l2KnL
jlml   pAj
9>>=>>; :
Notice that prices of A have been chosen so that the maximum obtains at
zero if and only if j =2 K: Using this and computing the sum of inequalities
pondered by mass over the set L we obtain the maximal prot of B :X
j2L
pBj mj 
X
j2K\L
pAj mj  
X
j2K\L
jmj +
X
j2LnK
uBj mj
+max

8>><>>:
X
(l)<(j)
j;l2L
jlmjml  
X
(l)>(j)
j;l2K\L
jlmjml
9>>=>>; 
X
j2K\L
X
l2KnL
jlmjml
The rst immediate point is that side j =2 K does not constrain the prot as
it appears only in the term
P
j2LnK u
B
j mj +
P
(l)<(j)
j2L
jlmjml which has
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positive coe¢ cient. Thus platform B sells to all sides outside K : J nK  L;
in particular
P
j2LnK u
B
j mj =
P
j =2K u
B
j mj
Now B will choose to sell only to J nK if adding sides can only reduce
its prots compared to
 =
X
j =2K
uBj mj +max
X
(l)<(j)
j;l=2K
jlmjml
This holds if for all L such that J nK  L:
X
j2K\L
pAj mj 
X
j2K\L
jmj  max

0BB@ X
(l)<(j)
j;l2L
jlmjml  
X
(l)>(j)
j;l2K\L
jlmjml
1CCA(14)
+max

0BB@ X
(l)<(j)
j;l =2K
jlmjml
1CCA+ X
j2K\L
X
l2KnL
jlmjml (15)
For the case L = J ; we have
X
j2K
pAj mj 
X
j2K
jmj  max

0BB@ X
(l)<(j)
j;l2J
jlmjml  
X
(l)>(j)
j;l2K
jlmjml
1CCA(16)
+max

X
(l)<(j)
j;l =2K
jlmjml (17)
Let s (:) be the order that maximizes
P
(l)<(j); j;l2J jlmjml 
P
(l)>(j); j;l2K jlmjml:
Let A then set price
pAj = j  
X
s(l)<s(j)
l2J
jlml +
X
s(l)>s(j)
l2K
jlml  
X
s(l)>s(j)
l =2K
ljml + xj
where xj > 0 andX
j2K
xjmj = max

X
(l)<(j)
j;l =2K
jlmjml  
X
s(l)<s(j)
j;l =2K
jlmjml: (18)
I claim that at these prices A sells to sides inK: First summing the equalities
pondered by mj and using
P
j2K
P
s(l)>s(j)
l =2K
ljm =
P
j =2K
P
s(l)<s(j)
l2K
jlml;
one can easily show that equation (16) holds with equality.
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Second for L such that J nK  L:X
j2K\L
pAj mj =
X
j2K\L
jmj  
X
j2K\L
X
s(l)<s(j)
l2J
jlmjml
+
X
j2K\L
X
s(l)>s(j)
l2K
jlmjml  
X
j =2K
X
s(l)<s(j)
l2K\L
jlml +
X
j2K\L
xjmj
Suppose equation (14) is violated, than one can nd an order ^ such thatX
j2K\L
X
s(l)<s(j)
l2J
jlmjml  
X
j2K\L
X
s(l)>s(j)
l2K
jlmjml +
X
j =2K
X
s(l)<s(j)
l2K\L
jlml  
X
j2K\L
xjmj
<
X
^(l)<^(j)
j;l2L
jlmjml  
X
^(l)>^(j)
j;l2K\L
jlmjml  max
0BB@ X
(l)<(j)
j;l=2K
jlmjml
1CCA  X
j2K\L
X
l2KnL
jlmjm
Using (18), we have:X
j2K\L
X
s(l)<s(j)
l2J
jlmjml  
X
j2K\L
X
s(l)>s(j)
l2K
jlmjml +
X
j =2K
X
s(l)<s(j)
l2K\L
jlml
+
X
s(l)<s(j)
j;l =2K
jlmjml +
X
j2KnL
xjmj
<
X
^(l)<^(j)
j;l2L
jlmjml  
X
^(l)>^(j)
j;l2K\L
jlmjml  
X
j2K\L
X
l2KnL
jlmjm
which we can write:X
s(l)<s(j)
j;l2J
jlmjml 
X
s(l)>s(j)
j;l2K
jlmjml <
X
^(l)<^(j)
j;l2L
jlmjml 
X
^(l)>^(j)
j;l2K\L
jlmjml 
X
j2K\L
X
l2KnL
jlmjml
+
X
j =2K\L
X
s(l)<s(j)
l2J
jlmjml 
X
j2KnL
X
s(l)>s(j)
l2K
jlmjml 
X
j =2K
X
s(l)<s(j)
l2K\L
jlml 
X
s(l)<s(j)
j;l =2K
jlmjml 
X
j2KnL
xjmj
Now dene the order  by  (l) <  (j) if
(l) < (j) if l 2 L and j =2 L;
(l) < (j)() ^(l) < ^(j) if j 2 L and l 2 L;
(l) < (j)() s (l) < s (j) if j =2 L and l =2 L:
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Then using J = L [ KnLX
(l)<(j)
j;l2J
jlmjml  
X
(l)>(j)
j;l2K
jlmjml =
X
^(l)<^(j)
j;l2L
jlmjml  
X
^(l)>^(j)
j;l2K\L
jlmjml  
X
j2K\L
X
l2KnL
jlmjml
+
X
j2KnL
X
l2L
jlmjml +
X
s(l)<s(j)
j;l2KnL
jlmjml  
X
s(l)>s(j)
j;l2KnL
jlmjml
Given that
X
s(l)<s(j)
j;l2J
jlmjml  
X
s(l)>s(j)
j;l2K
jlmjml 
X
(l)<(j)
j;l2J
jlmjml  
X
(l)>(j)
j;l2K
jlmjml;
we obtainX
j =2K\L
X
s(l)<s(j)
l2J
jlmjml  
X
j2KnL
X
s(l)>s(j)
l2K
jlmjml
 
X
j =2K
X
s(l)<s(j)
l2K\L
jlml  
X
s(l)<s(j)
j;l=2K
jlmjml  
X
j2KnL
xjmj
>
X
j2KnL
X
l2L
jlmjml +
X
s(l)<s(j)
j;l2KnL
jlmjml  
X
s(l)>s(j)
j;l2KnL
jlmjml
This implies
0 > 2
X
j2KnL
X
s(l)>s(j)
l2K\L
jlmjml +
X
j2KnL
X
s(l)>s(j)
l =2K
 
jl   lj

mjml +
X
j2KnL
xjmj
(19)
Now suppose that K = J ; the RHS of (19) is positive which yields a
contradiction. Thus all conditions (14) are veried. The prot is thanP
j jmj   
 (J ) :
Suppose that jl = lj for j 2 K and l =2 K; again the RHS of (19)
is positive. All conditions (14) are veried and A obtains prots given by
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(16) : MoreoverX
(l)<(j)
j;l2J
jlmjml  
X
(l)>(j)
j;l2K
jlmjml =
1
2
X
j;l2J
jlmjml  
1
2
X
j;l2K
jlmjml
=
1
2
X
j;l =2K
jlmjml +B (K)
and
X
(l)<(j)
j;l=2K
jlmjml =
1
2
X
j;l =2K
jlmjml;
so that the prot is
P
j2K jmj  B (K) :
Proof of proposition 4. In equilibrium A sets the price for j 2 K at
pAj = u
A
j  maxfuBj +
X
l2L
jlml   pBj ; 0g+
X
l2K
jlml
which is the maximal price at which a member of side j is willing to join
A when sides l 2 K do. If A decides to attract sides in H  L, it can do
so by setting prices for all sides in K [H; including those sides it already
serves:
p^Aj = u
A
j  maxfuBj +
X
l2LnH
jlml   pBj ; 0g+
X
l2K[H
jlml
The gain in prot is then
P
j2H p^
A
j mj+
P
j2K(p^
A
j  pAj )mj : Notice rst that
for j 2 K; the price di¤erential p^Aj   pAj is larger than
P
l2H jlmlmj ; with
equality when pBj  uBj +
P
l2L jlml:. The gain in A
0s prot is thus min-
imal when B sets very high prices for these sides, with a lower boundP
j2H p^
A
j mj +
P
j2K
P
l2H jlmlmj :
If B sells to all sides in L; it sets prices such that for all subset H :X
j2H
pBj mj 
X
j2H
(uBj  uAj )mj+
X
j2H
X
l2LnH
jlmlmj 
X
j2H
X
l2K[H
jlmlmj 
X
j2K
X
l2H
jlmlmj
An upper bound on the prot is then obtained for H = L :X
j2L
pBj mj 
X
j2L
(uBj   uAj )mj   B(L)  B(K):
If it is a Stackelberg leader, B can obtain this prot by setting a price
pBj = u
B
j   uAj  
PJ
l=1 jlml  
P
l2K ljml

for all sides within L:
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Proof of proposition 5.
KX
j=1
j   1K(J  K) 
0@KA(2)X
j=1
j   2KA(2)(J  KA(2))
1A
=
KX
j=1
j   2K(J  K) 
0@KA(2)X
j=1
j   2KA(2)(J  KA(2))
1A
+(2   1)
 
K(J  K) KA(1)(J  KA(1))

< 0 if KA(1)(J  KA(1)) < K(J  K):
Thus KA(1)(J  KA(1))  KA(2)(J  KA(2)) which reduces toKA (2)  J2
  KA (1)  J2
 :
Suppose that in addition the prot is quasi-concave in K at 2: Then
if KA (2)  12 ; the prot at  = 1 is increasing on K < 1=2 and thus
KA (1)  J2 which implies KA (2)  KA (1) : The symmetric argument
holds for KA (2)  12 :
Proof of lemma 3 . Suppose that A sells only to side 1 (the same
proof holds for side 2). Imposing w.l.o.g. pA2  uA2 +21m1, the equilibrium
price of B is pB2 = p
A
2   2   21m1:
B will conform to selling to side 2 only if
pB2 m2  pA1m1 + pA2m2   1m1   2m2 + (12   21)m1m2
pB2 m2  pA1m1   1m1 + uB2 m2  maxfuA2   pA2 ; 0gm2 + (21   12)m1m2
This reduces to
1m1   12m1m2  pA1m1
1m1 +maxfuA2   pA2 ; 0gm2   uA2m2 + pA2m2   21m1   (21   12)m1m2  pA1m1
The LHS of the second condition is maximal at the price pA2 = u
A
2 +
21m1; which yields:
A1 = min f1m1   12m1m2; 1m1   (21   12)m1m2g  pA1m1:
pB2 = u
B
2 :
This completes the proof the lemma.
Equilibrium with S = 2 and simultanous pricing. First a platform
cant cover the market in equilibrium unless k  0:
Suppose that A  0: Set the prices pAj verifying conditions 11 and
12: Then B0s best response is not to sell at all provided that A  A.
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Equilibrium prices of B must verify pBj = p
A
j   j   jlml; since otherwise
either B would sell or A could raise its price. Thus this is an equilibrium
if A prefers to cover the market than to sell to one side only. To sell to side
j alone, A must set a price p^Aj such that u
A
j + jjmj   p^Aj  uBj + jlml  
pBj ; which amounts to p^
A
j = p
A
j   2jlml: Thus an equilibrium must verify
pA1m1 + p
A
2m2  pAj mj   2jlmlmj or : pAl   2jlmj : Equilibrium prices
then exist if j + jlml   2ljml for both sides :
Suppose now that B  0. Choose prices pBj   j + jlml verifying
pW1 m1 + p
W
2 m2  B: A cant obtain a positive prot because its prof-
its is the maximum between
P
pBj mj   B;
 
pB1 + 1   12m2

m1 and 
pB2 + 2   21m1

m2; and they are all nonpositive. It must then be the
case that for one side pBj  pAj   j   jlml and for the other side pBl 
pAl  l+ljmj :Moreover this must hold at equality, since otherwise B could
raise its prices. B cant obtain more than B by covering the market
if
P
pAj mj   A  B: The unique prices that are compatible with the
fact that B covers the market and obtains at most B are thus pA1 =
pB1 + 1 + 12m2; p
A
2 = p
B
2 + 2   21m1: Notice that at price pA1   ",
side 1 joins B even alone. So B0s options if it doesnt cover the market are
to sell to side 1 at pB1 or to side 2 at p
A
2   2   21m1 = pB2   221m1: It
thus chooses to cover only if
B  maxpB1 m1; pB2 m2   221m1m2	
or
pB2  0
pB1   221m2
We can nd such prices whenever  221m2   1 + 12m2; 0   2 +
21m1:
Now assume that A sells to side 1 only. Each users should prefer to stay
with its side rather than to join the other side. This yields
uA1 + 11m1  max

uB1 + 12m2   pB1 ; 0
	  pA1
uB2  max

uA2 + 22m2 + 21m1   pA2 ; 0
	  pB2
Clearly to sustain the equilibrium, the best is to put prices pB1 and p
A
2 at
their minimal value given prots, which yields:
pA1 = p
B
1 + 1   12m2 and pB2 = pA2   2   21m1
Equilibrium conditions then write for B:
pB2 m2  pA1m1   1m1   12m1m2
+uB2 m2  max

uA2m2 + 22m
2
2   pA2m2; 0
	
+ 21m1m2
pB2 m2  pA1m1 + pA2m2   1m1   2m2 + 12m1m2   21m1m2
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For A we then get
pA1m1  pB2 m2 + pB1 m1 + 1m1 + 2m2 + (12 + 21)m1m2:
Overall this yields equilibrium conditions
1 + (12   221)m2  pA1
1   12m2  pA1
 2   (212 + 21)m1  pB2
Given that 12  21; the second constraint is implied by the rst which
gives the bounds on prots.
If A sells to side 2 the three conditions are the same, reverting the role
of the two sides. Given that 12  21; the relevant constraints are now
2   21m1  pA2 and  1   (12 + 221)m2  pB1 :
Proof of lemma 4. Notice that lemma 1 applies and it implies that
no side split between the two platforms. DA(PA; PB) is then characterized
by the following conditions
j 2 K iff : j + jjmj +
X
l2Knj
jlml   pAj  max
8<:X
l2Anj
jlml   pBj ; 0
9=; ;
j 2 A iff :
X
l2Anj
jlml   pBj > max
8<:j + jjmj + X
l2Knj
jlml   pAj ; 0
9=; ;
j 2 J n (Ai [ Ki) otherwise:
where the second inequality comes from the fact that joining platform
j cannot generate more prot for an individual than when the whole side
joins A or no platform. Notice that any allocation that veries these con-
ditions is a REA. We can thus dene DA(PA; PB) by taking a maximal
element in the set of REAs that veries these conditions.
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